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JENNIFER O'HARE*
A Commentary on McDonnell, Ahdieh,
Hamermesh, and Johnson's Views on Federal
Corporation Law and the AIG Kerfuffle
IN THIS ESSAY, I WILL COMMENT ON BRETT McDONNELL'S paper entitled "Recent
Skirmishes in the Battle Over Corporate Voting and Governance";' a paper by Rob-
ert Ahdieh called "Intersystemic Governance in Corporate Law: The Dialectical
Regulation of Rule 14a-8";2 a paper by Lawrence Hamermesh called "The Policy
Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law";3 and a paper by Jennifer Johnson called
"What's Good for the Goose? A Critical Essay on 'Best Practices' for Private Firms."
4
Then I will add a few comments of my own about the Second Circuit's recent
decision in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Ameri-
can International Group.5
Brett McDonnell's thought-provoking paper addresses the question of whether
our mixed federal system achieves a good trade-off between producing high-quality
law versus achieving a desirable balance between management and non-manage-
ment interest groups.6 McDonnell uses the response to the Enron-esque scandals of
the early 2000s as a jumping-off point.7 The question is whether our mixed system
worked better than a purely state or national system would have worked.
I was particularly struck by McDonnell's observation that a national system
might have worked better than our mixed system in addressing the corporate scan-
dals.' But, as he argues, the problem is rather than intervening too much, Congress
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and other national regulators are often prone to intervene too little.9 McDonnell
correctly points out that this inaction is largely due to the fact that managers are
better financed and organized than non-management groups, such as
shareholders."
McDonnell uses this observation to suggest an approach that courts can use to
analyze certain Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, including
the proxy access rule." According to McDonnell, when all things are equal, the
Court should interpret federal rules against the interests of managers. 2 Under such
an approach, if the Court errs, managers will be able to reverse the law either
through appeal, administrative remedies, or legislative recourse. 3 After all, manage-
ment is well organized.
Even though this canon of construction has a certain amount of intuitive appeal,
I am not sure that courts would actually explicitly adopt it. Nevertheless, it cer-
tainly deserves additional thought. When we read papers, sometimes we see the
germination of a big idea that we hope that will lead to the next paper. I would
enjoy seeing McDonnell develop this idea more. Perhaps McDonnell could com-
pare the advantages of his suggested interpretive approach to the judiciary's existing
approaches to interpreting SEC rules, such as judicial deference towards an agency's
own interpretation of its rules.'4 If McDonnell did this, perhaps he would be able to
demonstrate that his approach is superior to existing approaches.
Like Brett McDonnell, Robert Ahdieh is interested in our mixed system of corpo-
rate law. 5 I enjoyed Ahdieh's argument that federal corporate law is helpful be-
cause it forces the courts to engage significant issues and promotes innovation. 6 I
think that Ahdieh offers a promising framework for thinking about the interaction
between state and federal law, especially in the shareholder proposal arena.
Ahdieh's framework is promising because it is difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine whether the substance of a bylaw should be regulated by state law or federal
laws. '
Ahdieh hopes that this type of mixed corporate governance or this systemic reg-
ulation would lead to additional interaction between the federal and state lawmak-
ing bodies.'8 In other words, Ahdieh has suggested that the SEC would be able to
9. Id. at 362.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 365.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation is entitled to deference when the regulation is ambiguous); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to reasonable interpretations of
federal statutes by the relevant administrative agencies).
15. See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 166.
16. Id. at 181-82.
17. Id. at 171-72.
18. Id. at 183.
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ask the Delaware legislature or Delaware courts for their opinions on certain im-
portant issues of state law. 9 But that might be asking too much, given what we
know about how Delaware policymaking works.2"
Lawrence Hamermesh's paper is extremely valuable because it offers a unique
insight into the formation of Delaware corporate law. According to the paper, fend-
ing off federal incursion is only significant at the margins in Delaware.2 However,
the conventional wisdom is that federal law is actually extremely significant and
acts as a limitation on Delaware law.22 Thus, Hamermesh offers a provocative argu-
ment. Hamermesh is able to make such an argument because of his unique posi-
tion in the Delaware corporate law community. 3 Hamermesh's unique position
also allows us to give serious attention to his identification of, and observations on,
the heuristics used by Delaware corporate law policy makers.
Perhaps because of these powerful heuristics, Hamermesh believes that Delaware
will be an interested but largely inactive bystander to future federal efforts to re-
form corporate governance.24 Based on his persuasive articulation of the policy
foundations of Delaware corporate law, this appears to be a solid prediction, at
least in most cases. But I wonder if the recent increase in shareholder activism will
force Delaware corporate law policy makers, and perhaps even the courts, to put
aside their foundations, principles or heuristics and actually become more active
themselves, particularly regarding the proxy access issue. After all, the proxy access
issue puts Delaware's bylaw rule26 front and center.27
If shareholders ultimately gain access to the proxy under federal law, it would
seem that Delaware might finally have to face the question, as Hamermesh asserts,
that they have been successfully ducking for years: the extent to which a bylaw can
limit the authority of the board.2" At the very least, Delaware would have to con-
19. Id. at 175.
20. Lawrence Hamermesh, How We Make Law in Delaware, and What to Expect From Us in the Future, 2 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. 409, 409-10 (2007).
21. Hamermesh, supra note 3, at 1771.
22. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act: Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 325, 343 (2001); Hilary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 459-60 (2004);
Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 178 (2004).
23. Professor Hamermesh is a member of the Corporation Law Council of the Corporation Law Section of
the Delaware State Bar Association, which is responsible for the annual review and modernization of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. In addition, Professor Hamermesh is a member of the American Law
Institute and the Ruby R. Vale Professor of Corporate and Business Law at Widener University School of Law's
Delaware campus.
24. Hamermesh, supra note 3, at 1774.
25. See, e.g., G. Jeffrey MacDonald, A Record Year for Shareholder Activism, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June
28, 2004, at 14; Shawn Tully, Proxy Muses, FORTUNE, Dec. 25, 2006, at 159; Jan Frel, 'Tis the Season for Share-
holder Activism, CORPWATCH, May 4, 2005, http://www.corpwatch.orglarticle.php?id=12195.
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1772-74 (2006).
28. Hamermesh, supra note 3, at 1772-73.
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sider whether directors have the power to undo shareholder-adopted bylaws that
grant access to the proxy. The Delaware legislature has already taken some action
in this area. Last summer the Delaware legislature adopted amendments to the
General Corporation Law. These amendments prohibit boards from undoing
shareholder-adopted bylaws that require majority voting for directors.29 I look for-
ward to hearing Hamermesh's thoughts on this issue in the future.
All of the other papers address important issues relating to federal regulatory
initiatives that were intended to federalize some aspects of state corporate law.3 °
Jennifer Johnson's excellent paper demonstrates, however, that the federal govern-
ment can impact state corporate law without intending to do so." This idea of
unintended federalization of corporate law is fascinating.
Johnson observes that some private companies have voluntarily adopted some
aspects of federal corporate law, specifically, the use of independent directors in an
attempt to comply with the "best practices" in corporate governance. 2 The corpo-
rations hope that the adoption of "best practices" will serve as a liability shield.
Johnson persuasively demonstrates that private companies could be harmed by
blindly adopting corporate governance requirements that were aimed at public
companies.33 In particular, I appreciated her discussion of the relative importance
of the board's monitoring and advisory roles in public and private companies.34
After reading Johnson's paper, I wondered what private companies can do these
days. It seems as if private companies are caught between a rock and a hard place. If
private companies fail to make their boards more independent, they risk being sued
for failing to follow "best practices." If private companies make their boards more
independent, no matter how ill-advised, they risk losing the benefits of non-inde-
pendent director's advice.36
Johnson does an excellent job of pointing out these problems, but she does not
offer a solution to the problem. This is not a criticism of the paper because Johnson
did not intend to offer a solution. I am simply curious about Johnson's solution.
Does the answer lay in our old friend the business judgment rule? In other words, if
a private company's board carefully considers and then rejects adding additional
independent directors to their board, is that decision protected by the business
judgment rule? Is the board able to exchange one liability shield for another or does
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (Supp. 2006) (amending the statute, effective as of Aug. 1, 2006, to read
that "[a] bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the
election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors").
30. See generally Ahdieh, supra note 2; Hamermesh, supra note 3; McDonnell, supra note 1.
31. Johnson, supra note 4, at 264-66.
32. Id. at 264.
33. Id. at 268.
34. Id. at 269- 70.
35. Id. at 271.
36. Id.
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Johnson have something else in mind? I would be very interested in the answers to
these questions.
This conference is timely because last month, the Second Circuit, in American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group
(AIG),"7 directed a corporation to include a shareholder proposal that would re-
quire the company to include shareholder-nominated directors on the company's
proxy.3 Elsewhere, others have suggested that the court favored shareholder em-
powerment even though the Second Circuit expressly stated that they were taking
no side in the policy debate." That may be true, and certainly that is the result of
the case, but I read the case in a different way. To me, the opinion is more anti-SEC
than pro-shareholder. The court was clearly troubled by the SEC's failure to explain
the change in its interpretation of the election exclusion.4" In fact, the court ap-
peared to be downright annoyed that the SEC would not even concede that there
had been a change.4' The court said the SEC is able to change its interpretations
whenever they want, but they just have to explain it. 2 The court invited the SEC to
do so, and the SEC took them up on the invitation, scheduling a meeting that will
take place next week. 3
The Second Circuit takes the SEC to task several times on both the SEC's rule
interpreting process and substantive rulemaking. In fact, the court expressly states
that the court is not going to defer to an SEC rule.44 The court was tough on the
SEC's process by requiring the SEC to explain its change in interpretation. 5 As we
all know, that is not the usual practice with no-action letters.46 In the past, the SEC
has made huge changes in policy through its no-action letters with no explana-
tion. 7 So in that sense, the court was tough on the SEC's process.
The court was a little tough on the SEC substantively as well. The SEC has valid
concerns that shareholder proposals, like the one in AIG, would lead to unin-
formed voting by shareholders. As the SEC explained in its amicus letter brief, if
37. 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cit. 2006).
38. Id. at 123.
39. See, e.g., AIG Shareholders Win Ruling on 'Holy Grail' of Proxy Access: AFSCME Employee Pension Plan
v. AIG Inc., 22 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS AND DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. No. 6, at 5 (Sept. 18, 2006); Richard P.
Swanson & Darlene F. Routh, Shareholders Ready for Battle, 236 N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 20, 2006) col. 1.
40. AIG, 462 F.3d at 129.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Commission Calendars Proposed Amendment to Rule 14a-
8 Governing Director Nominations by Shareholders (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2006/2006-150.htm.
44. AIG, 462 F.3d at 129.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Securities Exchange
Act Rule 14a-8(d)(3)).
47. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters:
Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 948-67 (1998).
48. AIG, 462 F.3d at 130 n.9.
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proposals like AIG's are adopted, shareholders would be permitted to nominate
directors without providing important information that is normally required in
contested elections, such as the interests of each participant in the election.49
In any case, I wonder if the controversy over the election exclusion will soon be
rendered moot by other pending regulatory initiatives. As many of you know, last
December the SEC proposed rules that, if adopted, would permit the furnishing of
proxy materials on websites after sufficient notice.50 If adopted, these rules would
reduce the importance of shareholder proposals because the cost of a proxy contest
would be significantly reduced."' In short, I wonder whether the AIG kerfuffle
might actually turn out to be much ado about nothing that merely shifts the focus
to a different area of federalism.
49. See id.; Response to Inquiry of the Court at 12, Am. Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees, Employ-
ees Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l Group, No. 05-2825-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 2006).
50. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule to Provide Investors with
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-
166.htm.
51. Id.
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